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INTRODUCTION
William, a fifteen-year-old boy, was committed to a juvenile cor-
rectional facility in New Jersey for 225 days.1 For 178 of those days,
William was placed in solitary confinement in a cell measuring
seven feet by seven feet.2 He had no access to books, auditory stim-
ulation, or any opportunities to interact with others.3 Just a few
days after being placed in solitary confinement, William started
experiencing auditory and visual hallucinations and throwing his
bodily fluids at the cell walls.4 After only a week in solitary confine-
ment, William began self-mutilating by cutting himself.5 Not long
after that, he attempted suicide by hanging himself in his cell on
five separate occasions.6
Unfortunately, Williams experience is not unique in modern juve-
nile detention facilities in the United States. Solitary confinement,
a controversial practice used nationwide in state juvenile justice
systems, can have devastating psychological, physical, and develop-
mental effects on youth.7 Research has demonstrated that solitary
confinement is especially damaging for adolescents, yet juvenile
detention facilities often use the practice as a disciplinary measure.8
Recent efforts at reform, however, provide a framework for ending
experiences like Williams for adolescents across the country.
On May 21, 2014, Ohios Department of Youth Services entered
a landmark settlement agreement with the United States Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) to phase out and eventually end the use of
solitary confinement in its juvenile correctional facilities, while also
1. Sandra Simkins et al., The Harmful Use of Isolation in Juvenile Facilities: The Need
for Post-Disposition Representation, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 241, 256 (2012).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 257.
7. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION [ACLU], ALONE & AFRAID: CHILDREN HELD IN SOLI-
TARY CONFINEMENT AND ISOLATION IN JUVENILE DETENTION AND CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES
3-5 (2014), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Alone%20and%20Afraid%20COMPLETE%20
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/GW4H-HCMA].
8. See id. at 6.
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agreeing to provide more mental health services in those facilities.9
After beginning an investigation in 2007 at Ohios Scioto and
Marion Juvenile Correctional Facilities, the DOJ found numerous
potentially unconstitutional flaws with Ohios lack of mental health
care and use of solitary confinement in its juvenile correctional
facilities.10 In particular, the DOJ found that the facilities often im-
posed solitary confinement on juveniles as a knee-jerk, prolonged
first response to even minor behavioral infractions and that it was
frequently used as a means of isolating mentally ill youth instead
of providing them with psychological treatment.11
Although Ohio and the DOJ entered a consent decree in 2008 that
aimed to remedy these deficiencies,12 the DOJ discovered in 2013
that the State was not complying with the terms of the consent
decree.13 By May 2014, Ohio and the DOJ had reached a new, more
comprehensive agreement to end entirely the use of solitary confine-
ment in all of the States juvenile correctional facilities.14 This
settlement agreement was in place until December 2015, when the
DOJ and the State agreed to terminate the consent decree as a
result of Ohios substantial compliance with the terms of the settle-
ment agreement.15
9. See Press Release, U.S. Dept of Justice [DOJ], Justice Department Settles Lawsuit
Against State of Ohio to End Unlawful Seclusion of Youth in Juvenile Correctional Facilities
(May 21, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-settles-lawsuit-against-
state-ohio-end-unlawful-seclusion-youth-juvenile [https://perma.cc/D42T-NBYQ] [hereinafter
Ohio Settlement Press Release].
10. See id. These flaws included potential violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
11. Letter from Wan J. Kim, Assistant Attorney Gen., DOJ, to the Honorable Ted
Strickland, Governor of Ohio 1, 7, 10 (May 9, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
crt/legacy/2011/04/14/scioto_findlet_5-9-07.pdf [https://perma.cc/B49N-TQR7].
12. The 2008 consent decree aimed, among other things, to decrease the use of solitary
confinement on youth with mental illnesses at the Marion and Scioto juvenile correction
facilities. See United States v. Ohio, No. 2:08-cv-475 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 23, 2009) (order adopting
proposed modifications to the stipulation for injunctive relief); United States v. Ohio, No. 2:08-
cv-475, at 1, 6-8 (S.D. Ohio June 24, 2008) (order approving stipulation for injunctive relief).
13. See Ohio Settlement Press Release, supra note 9.
14. See United States v. Ohio, No. 2:08-cv-475 (S.D. Ohio May 21, 2014) (order detailing
actions required to be taken by defendant). The 2014 settlement agreement is broader than
the 2008 settlement agreement and aims to end the use of solitary confinement for all youth,
not only mentally ill youth, in all of the States juvenile correctional facilities. See id.
15. See Press Release, DOJ, Justice Department Agrees to Termination of Consent Decree
Concerning Children in Ohio Juvenile Correctional Facilities (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-agrees-termination-consent-decree-concerning-children-
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Ohios promise to end the use of solitary confinement is notable
because the State sought to completely end the use of solitary con-
finement for youth in all of its facilities instead of merely modifying
existing policies regarding the practice.16 The agreement signals
that policies concerning solitary confinement in juvenile correctional
centers may soon begin to evolve nationwide.17 Several civil rights
advocacy organizations have long argued that solitary confinement
is particularly psychologically and developmentally harmful for
children.18 These organizations are hopeful that Ohios settlement
agreement is an important first step toward nationwide juvenile
justice reform.19
There are approximately 70,000 children in juvenile justice fa-
cilities throughout the country on any given day.20 Although each
state has its own set of regulations and policies regarding its
juvenile justice system, these systems share similarities nation-
wide.21 Because children are developmentally different from adults,
the juvenile justice system attempts to approach juveniles less
punitively.22 Unlike the adult criminal justice system, which aims
to deter crime and punish criminals, the main purposes of the juve-
nile justice system are rehabilitation and treatment, in addition to
community protection.23 Courts adjudicate juveniles as delin-
quentrather than guiltyand typically offer a wide range of
treatment options, including placement in juvenile correctional
facilities.24
ohio-juvenile [https://perma.cc/D4CS-FE68]. The consent decree was terminated due to the
remarkable improvement in conditions of confinement at DYS juvenile facilities, including
the end of disciplinary solitary confinement and improved mental health services. Id.
16. See id.
17. See Editorial, A Model for Juvenile Detention Reform, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/opinion/a-model-for-juvenile-detention-reform.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/CKD3-BWDQ]; see also Steven Hsieh, Ohio Will Stop Using Solitary
Confinement to Punish Kids, NATION (May 21, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/blog/179975/
ohio-will-stop-using-solitary-confinement-punish-kids [https://perma.cc/8YGX-GRB6].
18. See, e.g., ACLU, supra note 7, at 3-5.
19. See, e.g., Hsieh, supra note 17.
20. See ACLU, supra note 7, at 6.
21. See Juvenile vs Adult Justice, PBS FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/front
line/shows/juvenile/stats/juvvsadult.html [https://perma.cc/MQ4Z-4WU9] (last visited Feb. 21,
2016).
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. Id.
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Solitary confinement is widespread in American correctional
institutions, including juvenile correctional facilities.25 Solitary
confinement, also known in juvenile correctional facilities by
harmless-sounding names like room confinement, restricted en-
gagement, seclusion, or reflection,26 is routinely used as a means
of punishing disobedient youth.27 Children can spend days, weeks,
or even months in solitary confinement.28 Research has shown that
solitary confinement has particularly adverse effects on youth,
resulting in or exacerbating existing mental health problems like
agitation and depression and elevating the risk of suicide.29 Much
of the research suggests that confining youth in juvenile correction-
al facilities increases their recidivism rates, whereas providing
25. See US: Look Critically at Widespread Use of Solitary Confinement, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (June 18, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/18/us-look-critically-widespread-
use-solitary-confinement [https://perma.cc/2UUC-3MYR].
26. ACLU, supra note 7, at 2; see also Ohio Settlement Press Release, supra note 9.
27. Youth in adult correctional facilities are also frequently held in solitary confinement,
but those youths are sometimes confined to protect them from the population of adult in-
matesan administrative, not disciplinary, purpose. See Tamar R. Birckhead, Children in
Isolation: The Solitary Confinement of Youth, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 19-20 (2015).
Solitary confinement of youth in adult facilities is also a problematic practice that can be
extremely damaging to youth, but it has a very different function in adult facilities. Reforming
adult facilities presents additional challenges that reforming youth facilities does not present,
such as diverting youth from the adult justice system. See Symposium, Juveniles in Solitary
Confinement: Rehabilitation or Torture?, 20 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 689, 697-98 (2014) [here-
inafter Juveniles in Solitary Confinement]. To address these concerns, President Obama
recently announced that he will take executive action to ban placing juveniles in solitary con-
finement in federal prisons. See Barack Obama, Opinion, Why We Must Rethink Solitary
Confinement, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/barack-
obama-why-we-must-rethink-solitary-confinement/2016/01/25/29a361f2-c384-11e5-8965-
0607e0e265ce_story.html?tid=a_inl [https://perma.cc/KA29-BHGT]; see also Juliet Eilperin,
Obama Bans Solitary Confinement for Juveniles in Federal Prisons, WASH. POST (Jan. 26,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-bans-solitary-confinement-for-
juveniles-in-federal-prisons/2016/01/25/056e14b2-c3a2-11e5-9693-933a4d31bcc8_story.html
[https://perma. cc/A8Y8-A9ZG]. Although laudable, President Obamas reforms affect only
juveniles held in federal facilities for adults, not juveniles in state-run juvenile correctional
facilities, and are not part of any permanent statutory reform.
The separate concerns regarding children in federal facilities in adult prisons are also be-
yond the scope of the Ohio settlement agreement, which concerned only state-run juvenile
correctional facilities. Due to the different nature of solitary confinement of youth in adult cor-
rectional facilities, this Note will instead focus on solitary confinement of youth in juvenile
correctional facilities.
28. Juveniles in Solitary Confinement, supra note 27, at 698.
29. See infra Part I.B.
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adequate mental health treatment lowers these rates.30 Addition-
ally, certain research postulates that the damaging effects of
solitary confinement increase rates of recidivism among juveniles.31
Because of the damaging effects that solitary confinement has on
youth, it should no longer be used as a disciplinary measure in
juvenile correctional facilities.32
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue of
juvenile solitary confinement, although there are a handful of fed-
eral cases that have addressed the constitutionality of certain
conditions of solitary confinement in juvenile correctional facili-
ties.33 Some lower courts have recognized a right to rehabilitative
treatment for juveniles held in juvenile correctional facilities using
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment arguments.34 These courts held
that conditions of solitary confinement were unconstitutional.35
But most courts hearing lawsuits challenging the conditions of
juvenile correctional facilities have not recognized that a right to
treatment exists.36 In fact, in Youngberg v. Romeo, an unrelated case
about the conditions of state-run asylums, the Supreme Court indi-
cated that there might not be such a right to treatment at all.37 As
a result, sweeping reform of the juvenile justice system and the
nationwide use of solitary confinement likely will not be achieved
through constitutional challenges in federal or state courts.
By implementing statutes mirroring the language used in Ohios
plan to eliminate solitary confinement, however, state legislators
30. See infra Part I.C.
31. See infra Part I.C.
32. Although rare situations may arise in juvenile correctional facilities that will require
disruptive, violent, or dangerous youth to be isolated for disciplinary reasons, Ohios reforms
aim to limit the duration of such seclusion. See infra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
Concerns about the harmful effects of solitary confinement on children are tantamount to
concerns about the safety of staff and youth in juvenile correctional facilities and must still
be addressed. This Note proposes, however, that states can address these safety and disci-
plinary concerns more effectively without using solitary confinement, especially as a first
response to misbehavior. See infra Part IV.
33. See infra Part III.
34. See infra Part III.A.
35. See infra Part III.A.
36. See infra Part III.B.
37. See 457 U.S. 307, 320-22, 324 (1982) (holding that a courts evaluation of whether a
persons constitutional rights have been violated requires the balancing of liberty interests
against relevant state interests).
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could eventually end the use of a harmful and potentially life-
threatening practice while improving mental health treatment and
making their juvenile justice systems more effective. This Note will
argue that states should implement reforms paralleling those that
Ohio has undertaken by eliminating the use of solitary confinement
in their juvenile correctional facilities. This approach balances the
states interests in the safety and security of their facilities with
youths interest in a more rehabilitative, less harmful experience in
the juvenile justice system.
Part I describes the harmful effects that solitary confinement has
on juveniles and demonstrates how solitary confinement is a coun-
terproductive, inefficient practice. Part II discusses the current
national standards and state policies that address solitary confine-
ment. It illustrates how these policies are often broadly worded or
inadequately designed to prevent the damaging effects of solitary
confinement. Part III describes courts reluctance to recognize a
right to treatment and suggests that litigation alone is not an ade-
quate means of eliminating the use of solitary confinement in
juvenile detention facilities. Instead, Part III argues that state
legislation is a better vehicle to achieve this goal. Part IV outlines
Ohios settlement with the DOJ and recommends that states imple-
ment provisions of the settlement in statutes to eliminate the use of
solitary confinement in juvenile correctional facilities while bal-
ancing the need for safety and security.
I. THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT ON
JUVENILES
Solitary confinement is defined as physical and social isolation
for between twenty-two and twenty-four hours each day for one day
or more.38 In juvenile correctional facilities, youth in solitary con-
finement are often placed in unfurnished, cramped cells for days,
weeks, or months at a time.39 While juveniles are held in solitary
38. See Juan E. Méndez (Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), Interim Report of the Special
Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. A/66/268 (Aug. 5, 2011).
39. See ACLU, supra note 7, at 2.
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confinement at juvenile correctional facilities, they are often denied
or deprived of access to various services, including psychological
care, educational programming, and recreational or physical activ-
ity.40 For instance, the American Civil Liberties Union has reported
that youth are sometimes not even given access to schoolbooks.41
Solitary confinement is distinguishable from brief interventions like
short-term emergency seclusion or isolation in the event of disrup-
tive behavior.42 Solitary confinement is not a mere time out, but
instead a more extreme, longer-lasting form of seclusion with a
disciplinary purpose.43
A. Physical and Developmental Harm
There is unfortunately only limited research on the effects of
prolonged isolation on youth.44 Existing studies, however, demon-
strate that solitary confinement of youth correlates with high rates
of suicide, depression, and future criminal activity.45 Youth are still
developing physically and mentally when they are held in juvenile
correctional facilities.46 Solitary confinement can negatively impact
their physical, psychological, and developmental health.47 For
instance, when youth are placed in solitary confinement for
40. See Simkins et al., supra note 1, at 252.
41. See ACLU, supra note 7, at 2.
42. Such brief periods of emergency seclusion occur as short-term, immediate responses
to interrupt the disruptive behavior of youth who are acting out. ACLU & HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, GROWING UP LOCKED DOWN: YOUTH IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN JAILS AND PRI-
SONS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 21 (2012), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
us1012ForUpload.pdf [https://perma.cc/2L7A-H7AY] [hereinafter GROWING UP LOCKED
DOWN]. Because of its duration, this form of seclusion is a separate practice from solitary
confinement, although the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative recommends that this
brief seclusion in response to acting out last no longer than four hours at a time. Id. at 21
n.49. Accredited bodies, such as the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
and the National Commission of Correctional Healthcare, support the use of such brief
seclusion, but not the use of solitary confinement, in juvenile correctional facilities. See
Juvenile Justice Reform Comm., Solitary Confinement of Juvenile Offenders, AM.ACAD.CHILD
& ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY (Apr. 2012), https://www.aacap. org/aacap/policy_statements/
2012/solitary_confinement_of_juvenile_offenders.aspx [https://perma.cc/6CY4-JNP3].
43. See Laura Anne Gallagher, Note, More than a Time Out: Juvenile Solitary
Confinement, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POLY 244, 246-49 (2014).
44. See Birckhead, supra note 27, at 10.
45. See id. at 10-12, 14, 16.
46. See id. at 14-15.
47. See id.
2016] ELIMINATING JUVENILE SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 1027
extended periods of time, they are deprived of the opportunity for
meaningful out-of-cell physical exercise, which is needed to support
adequate muscle and bone development.48 Additionally, youth in
solitary confinement are often cut off from educational program-
ming, access to reading materials, and contact with loved ones or
other privileges that allow them to socialize with others.49 As a re-
sult, youth are denied the opportunity to develop socially or pursue
an education.50 Furthermore, denying adolescents the opportunity
to acquire or master new skills may decrease their ability to suc-
cessfully reintegrate into their communities when they are released
from a correctional facility.51
B. Psychological Harm
Solitary confinements psychological effects on youth are perhaps
even more disturbing than its detrimental physical and develop-
mental effects. Even brief amounts of time in isolation have grave
consequences for juveniles psychological health.52 For instance, a
2002 DOJ study revealed that juveniles who had been in isolation
for even a few hours experienced higher levels of anxiety, depres-
sion, and paranoia.53 Prolonged periods of solitary confinement can
have even more severe effects on youth. Several studies have found
that adults who are placed in solitary confinement experience
several negative symptoms, including hypersensitivity to stimuli;
headaches; problems sleeping; memory loss; confusion; increased
anxiety and nervousness; agitation; aggression; fits of rage; chronic
48. See ACLU, supra note 7, at 5.
49. See, e.g., Letter from Wan J. Kim, Assistant Attorney Gen., DOJ, to the Honorable
Robert R. Altice, Jr. et al., Exec. Comm., Marion Cty. Superior Court (Aug. 6, 2007), http://
www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/marion_juve_ind_findlet_8-6-07.pdf [https://perma.
cc/GGF4-UX4A]. As a result of a DOJ investigation of conditions at Marion County Juvenile
Detention Center in Indiana, investigators found that youth placed in isolation typically did
not receive mental health care services, special educational services, regular access to medi-
cal care, or daily large muscle exercise. Id. at 12; see also Simkins et al., supra note 1, at 257-
58.
50. See ACLU, supra note 7, at 5.
51. See Matt Olson, Kids in the Hole, PROGRESSIVE, Aug. 1, 2003, at 26.
52. See ROBERT L. LISTENBEE, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERALS NATIONAL
TASKFORCE ON CHILDREN EXPOSED TOVIOLENCE 178 (2012), http://www.justice.gov/defending
childhood/cev-rpt-full.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GF4-CJT4].
53. Id.
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depression; hallucinations; and psychosis.54 Because of their age,
juveniles are more developmentally vulnerable than adults.55 As a
result, juveniles are often at greater risk for experiencing these ad-
verse reactions to solitary confinement than more developmentally
mature adults.56
Additionally, even brief periods of isolation can cause retrauma-
tization of youth.57 Many youth in juvenile correctional facilities
have experienced neglect, abuse, or have been exposed to violence
or other traumas.58 As a result of experiencing past trauma, delin-
quent youth often have histories of mood disorders, difficulty trust-
ing others, substance abuse, and aggression.59 Even short periods of
isolation or solitary confinement are capable of activat[ing] painful
memories of these past traumas, causing revictimization that
makes youth feel powerless and alone.60 Such retraumatization can
undermine progress that youth have made to overcome such trauma
and its negative effects.61
Most concerning is that the juveniles placed in solitary confine-
ment in juvenile correctional facilities represent approximately half
of all incidents of self-harm and suicide in juvenile correctional
facilities.62 Solitary confinement is associated with higher incidence
of self-harm and suicide among juveniles.63 Even juveniles who have
never previously thought of harming themselves can experience
desperation and feelings of hopelessness while in solitary confine-
ment, which can lead to suicidal ideation.64 One study found that 62
percent of suicide victims in juvenile correctional facilities were held
54. See, e.g., Stuart Grassian, Psychopathological Effects of Solitary Confinement, 140
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1450 (1983); Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary
and Supermax Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 124, 133-34 (2003); Holly A. Miller &
Glenn R. Young, Prison Segregation: Administrative Detention Remedy or Mental Health Prob-
lem?, 7 CRIM. BEHAV. & MENTAL HEALTH 85, 90-91 (1997).
55. See ACLU, supra note 7, at 3-4.
56. See Juvenile Justice Reform Comm., supra note 42.
57. See Simkins et al., supra note 1, at 257-59.
58. See id. at 258-59.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. See ACLU, supra note 7, at 5.
63. See id.
64. See Simkins et al., supra note 1, at 259.
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in solitary confinement at some point, and 50 percent had been in
solitary confinement at the time of their suicide.65
Furthermore, solitary confinement amplifies the risks of serious
psychological, developmental, and physical problems for children
with disabilities or preexisting behavioral or mental health prob-
lems.66 Youth in juvenile correctional facilities frequently have
preexisting behavioral or mental health problems, which can result
in misbehavior or disobedience.67 Instead of using mental health
treatment to change the behavior of juveniles with preexisting
behavioral or mental health problemsor perhaps because of a lack
of availability of mental health services to youth in such facili-
tiespersonnel at juvenile correctional facilities often choose to
discipline unruly youth by placing them in solitary confinement.68
Time spent in isolation then exacerbates these behavioral and
mental health problems.69 Although staff at juvenile correctional
facilities must be able to properly discipline youth for bad behavior,
the staff frequently place youth in solitary confinement for even
minor infractions.70
C. Recidivism
Proponents of the use of solitary confinement in juvenile correc-
tional facilities argue that solitary confinement is necessary and
justified in order to punish children when they break rules or are
disruptive or violent.71 The use of solitary confinement, however,
often causes youth to become even more dangerous as a result of the
65. LINDSAY M. HAYES, NATL CTR. ON INSTS. & ALTS., JUVENILE SUICIDE IN CONFINE-
MENT:A NATIONAL SURVEY 24, 28 (2004), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/grants/206354.
pdf [https://perma.cc/46GG-6LW7].
66. See Simkins et al., supra note 1, at 257-61.
67. See Douglas E. Abrams, Reforming Juvenile Delinquency Treatment to Enhance Re-
habilitation, Personal Accountability, and Public Safety, 84 OR. L. REV. 1001, 1086-91 (2005).
68. See Simkins et al., supra note 1, at 260-61.
69. See id.; see also GROWING UP LOCKED DOWN, supra note 42, at 2.
70. See Abrams, supra note 67, at 1024; see also Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Assistant
Attorney Gen., DOJ, to the Honorable Mike Foster, Governor of La., http://www.justice.gov/
crt/louisiana-children-louisiana-findings-letter [https://perma.cc/3DGV-MHPL] (last updated
Aug. 6, 2015) (describing how guards often place youth at Louisianas Monroe and Tallulah
Correctional Centers for Youth in solitary confinement for even minor disciplinary infrac-
tions).
71. See ACLU, supra note 7, at 6-7.
1030 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1019
deleterious mental health consequences, lack of interaction with
others, and generally poor treatment in solitary confinement.72
Youth who are placed in solitary confinement tend to become more
dangerous, more antisocial, more likely to reoffend, ... and more
likely to suffer a lifetime [of] mental illness.73
Research indicates that solitary confinement actually results in
higher recidivism rates, whereas access to alternative educational
and vocational programs has been linked with decreased rates of
recidivism.74 Although research specifically focusing on recidivism
in juvenile facilities is currently limited, research on adults who
have been held in solitary confinement suggests that inmates held
in solitary confinement are at a significant disadvantage compared
to their peers in the general population.75 Shira Gordon argues that
this disadvantage results from inmates restricted access to edu-
cational, vocational, and rehabilitative programming.76 Solitary
confinement provides inmates fewer chances to learn how to man-
age interpersonal conflict or to develop reentry plans, which can be
critical to successful transition back into society.77 Access to this
programming, however, as well as family visitation, lead[s] to fewer
disciplinary violations during incarceration, reductions in recidi-
vism, increases in employment opportunities, and to increases in
participation in education upon release.78
Despite current gaps in the available research on solitary confine-
ment and recidivism among juveniles, the research suggests that
less restrictive environments put youth at a lower risk for reenter-
ing the juvenile or adult criminal justice system in the future.79 For
72. See Gary Gately, Juvenile Solitary Confinement: Modern-Day Torture in the US, JUV.
JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.jjie.org/juvenile-solitary-confinement-
modern-day-torture-in-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/A28D-L4ND].
73. Id.
74. See Shira E. Gordon, Note, Solitary Confinement, Public Safety, and Recidivism, 47
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 495, 498 (2014). For instance, a study of 1247 adult prisoners found
that 24.2 percent of prisoners held in solitary confinement were reconvicted of violent crimes,
compared to 20.5 percent of prisoners in the general population. Id. at 520-21.
75. See id. at 518.
76. See id.
77. Id. (quoting Daniel P. Mears & William D. Bales, SupermaxIncarceration and Recid-
ivism, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 1131, 1138 (2009)).
78. Id. (quoting Gerald Gaes et al., Adult Correctional Treatment, 26 CRIME & JUST. 361,
402-03 (1999)).
79. See id. at 518-19.
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instance, juveniles who are placed in less restrictive correctional
environments tend to recidivate at lower rates than their peers in
more restrictive environments.80 Additionally, juveniles who are in
juvenile correctional facilities tend to recidivate at higher rates than
their peers in less restrictive community-based programs.81 Gordon
argues that because detention leads to recidivism for juveniles,
solitary confinementthe most restrictive kind of confinement
available in juvenile facilitiesmay increase recidivism to an even
greater degree.82 Such a trend suggests that solitary confinement is
counterproductive as a disciplinary measure, especially against the
backdrop of the juvenile justice systems rehabilitative goals.83
Very short periods of isolation, measured in minutes, are perhaps
appropriate in rare emergencies and to resolve incidents of vio-
lence.84 But children are often placed in solitary confinement, a
longer-lasting form of isolation, for even minor infractions and for
unnecessary lengths of time. Those periods of solitary confinement
restrict access to privileges like visitation, as well as to exercise,
therapy, and education programs.85 Based on data from a 2003 sur-
vey, one-third of the approximately 35,000 children in custody had
been isolated with no contact with other youth at some point in their
detention.86 Of those who had been isolated, over half were held in
solitary confinement for longer than twenty-four hours.87 Although
it is perhaps appropriate to use isolation for very brief intervals of
time to neutralize violent outbursts or disobedience, it is counter-
productive and unnecessary to use solitary confinement to address
behavioral issues in juvenile correctional facilities.
As a result of solitary confinements harmful and potentially life-
threatening effects on youth, civil rights organizations,88 medical
80. Id.
81. Id. at 518.
82. Id. at 519.
83. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. More restrictive punishments, on
average, tend to demonstrate higher rates of recidivism. By eliminating solitary confinement,
legislatures could perhaps lower these rates.
84. ACLU, supra note 7, at 7; see also GROWING UP LOCKED DOWN, supra note 42, at 21.
85. See ACLU, supra note 7, at 7; see also Gordon, supra note 74, at 518.
86. See ACLU, supra note 7, at 7.
87. See id.
88. See id.
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professionals,89 and even the United States Attorney General90 have
vocalized their opposition to its use in juvenile correctional facilities.
Although national standards and state policies place some limits on
the use of solitary confinement in juvenile correctional facilities,
Part II will discuss how these standards and policies do not ade-
quately restrict the use of isolation or solitary confinement in light
of its harmful physical, developmental, and psychological effects on
youth.
II. EXISTING FEDERAL AND STATE POLICIES AND NATIONAL
STANDARDS ON SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN JUVENILE
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES
There are several already-existing federal and state policies that
address the use of solitary confinement in juvenile correctional
facilities.91 This Part will first address relevant state laws before
discussing federal statutes and national standards concerning soli-
tary confinement in juvenile corrections.
A. State Laws
Policies regarding time limits and the use of solitary confinement
in juvenile correctional facilities vary widely across the states. For
instance, twenty states prohibit placing juveniles in solitary confine-
ment for punitive reasons for more than twenty-four hours.92 Eleven
89. The American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, for instance, has stated
that it opposes the use of solitary confinement in correctional facilities for juveniles.
Juvenile Justice Reform Comm., supra note 42.
90. Former Attorney General Eric Holder has criticized solitary confinement, stating:
Solitary confinement can be dangerous, and a serious impediment to the ability
of juveniles to succeed once released .... Let me be clear, there may be times
when it becomes necessary to remove a detained juvenile from others in order
to protect staff, other inmates, or the juvenile himself from harm. However, this
action should be taken only in a limited way where there is a valid reason to do
so, and for a limited amount of time.
Press Release, DOJ, Attorney General Holder Criticizes Excessive Use of Solitary Confine-
ment for Juveniles withMental Illness (May 14, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-
general-holder-criticizes-excessive-use-solitary-confinement-juveniles-mental [https://perma.
cc/H4UR-TML8].
91. See ACLU, supra note 7, at 8-9.
92. See Birckhead, supra note 27, at 39.
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states cap solitary confinement between one and four days.93 Eleven
other states limit solitary confinement of juveniles to between five
and ninety days,94 and ten states place no time limits at all on the
duration of solitary confinement for youth.95 Although limiting
solitary confinement in juvenile correctional facilities is certainly
preferable to having no limits on its duration, these time limits ig-
nore the harmful effects that even short amounts of time in isolation
have on youth.96 Additionally, these limits alone do not restrict the
ability of staff in juvenile correctional facilities to use solitary con-
finement at their discretion.
Six states have statutory limits on the use of solitary confinement
in their juvenile facilities.97 These states include Alaska,98 Connect-
icut,99 Maine,100 Nevada,101 Oklahoma,102 and West Virginia.103 These
statutes generally ban punitive juvenile solitary confinement or re-
quire special approval to use solitary confinement, and even then
allow its use only for predetermined amounts of time. Although
these statutory prohibitions on solitary confinement aim to reduce
or eliminate the use of solitary confinement in juvenile correctional
facilities, they have several flaws and ambiguities that make their
desired outcome difficult to achieve.
The language of Alaskas statute, for instance, prohibits the use
of solitary confinement in some, but not all, situations, which still
allows staff at juvenile correctional facilities the discretion to place
youth in solitary confinement.104 The text of the statute forbids
93. Id. These states are Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada,
North Carolina, Rhode Island, Washington, and Montana. Id. at 39 n.269.
94. Id. Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Jersey, South Dakota, and Virginia
limit solitary confinement to five days, while California, Kansas, Nebraska, and Wisconsin
set maximums of five days or longer. Id. at 39 n.270.
95. Id. Statutes from Alabama, Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio,
Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, and South Carolina do not set maximum limits for juvenile sol-
itary confinement. Id. at 39 n.271. Ohio, however, has recently agreed to end solitary
confinement for juveniles for any length of time. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
96. See supra Part I.
97. See ACLU, supra note 7, at 8, 25-26.
98. ALASKA DELINQUENCY R. 13 (LexisNexis 2015).
99. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-133(e) (West 2015).
100. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, § 3032(5) (2015).
101. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 62B.215 (LexisNexis 2014).
102. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 377:35-11-4 (2015).
103. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-721(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2015).
104. See ACLU, supra note 7, at 24.
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confining juveniles for punitive reasons but does not prohibit the
use of solitary confinement for disciplinary, safety, or security
reasons.105 Similarly, Maines statute prohibits using solitary con-
finement as a punishment in juvenile correctional facilities but does
not expressly forbid the use of solitary confinement in other
situations.106
Some states have statutes that supposedly forbid solitary
confinement yet authorize the use of solitary confinement in certain
situations, or as a sanction for certain offenses. Oklahomas statute,
for example, bans punitive juvenile solitary confinement,107 but the
Oklahoma Administrative Code describes how solitary confine-
ment may still be used under emergency conditions.108 Similarly,
West Virginias statute forbids lock[ing a youth] alone in a room
for punitive reasons109 or impos[ing] ... solitary confinement to
punish youth,110 but allows room confinement tantamount to soli-
tary confinement for up to ten days as a sanction for certain offenses
in juvenile correctional facilities.111
To be clear, these statutes are flawed not because they allow staff
to reestablish order and safety in these facilities, but instead be-
cause they allow staff to use discretion when deciding whether
solitary confinement is appropriate.
Unlike these other four states, Connecticuts statute bans all
solitary confinement for children.112 The statute is flawed, however,
because solitary confinement itself is not defined, creating ambigu-
ity in the statutes enforcement.113 As a result, youth are still held
in conditions that could be described as solitary confinement.114
105. ALASKA DELINQUENCY R. 13 (LexisNexis 2015).
106. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, § 3032(5) (2015); see also ACLU, supra note 7, at 24.
107. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 2-7-603(B) (West 2015).
108. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 377:35-11-4(a) (2015).
109. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-721(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2015).
110. Id.
111. JUVENILE JUSTICE COMMN,W. VA. SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT
25-27 (2014), http://www.courtswv.gov/court-administration/juvenlie-justice-commission/JJ
Cannualreport_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ND4-VK73] (describingparametersofandreasons
for room confinement for safety concerns, including immediate sanction up to three days, or
ten days for severe cases); see also ACLU, supra note 7, at 25.
112. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-133(e) (West 2015).
113. See ACLU, supra note 7, at 24.
114. See, e.g., Connecticut DCF: Transgender Girl Jane Doe Found After Escaping from
Therapeutic Program, NEW HAVEN REG. (Sept. 16, 2014, 12:32 PM), http://www.nhregister.
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Finally, Nevada requires special approval to use solitary confine-
ment on any child in a juvenile correctional facility if staff have
exhausted less restrictive options to modify the childs behavior
and ensure safety and security.115 The statute limits the use of
corrective room restriction to no longer than seventy-two hours.116
Although Nevadas statute laudably aims to first exhaust alterna-
tives to solitary confinement before approving its use, the statute
ignores the potentially harmful effects of even a few hours spent in
isolation by allowing confinement to continue for up to three con-
secutive days.117
Several states lack statutes that expressly prohibit the use of soli-
tary confinement. Notably, however, certain states like Missouri
take unique approaches to their juvenile justice systems that large-
ly preclude the need to use solitary confinement.118 Missouri under-
took a series of significant reforms beginning in the 1970s that have
transformed its juvenile justice system into a highly regarded na-
tional model for rehabilitation.119 By focusing on providing mental
health care to youth in small regional facilities as part of a multi-
layered treatment experience, Missouri aims to help troubled teens
make lasting behavioral changes and prepare for successful tran-
sitions back to the community.120 Missouris juvenile correctional
facilities serve small groups of ten to twelve youth supervised by
staff.121 When youth act out by becoming disruptive, disrespectful,
com/general-news/20140916/connecticut-dcf-transgender-girl-jane-doe-found-after-escaping-
from-therapeutic-program [https://perma.cc/K52X-Z7JK].
115. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 62B.215 (LexisNexis 2014).
116. Id.; see also ACLU, supra note 7, at 24.
117. See supra Part I.
118. See, e.g., RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., THE MISSOURI MODEL: REIN-
VENTING THE PRACTICE OF REHABILITATING YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS (2010), http://static1.1.sqs
pcdn.com/static/f/658313/9749173/1291845016987/aecf_mo_fullreport_webfinal.pdf?token=0u
B1HfvM6GNoHi7Zox9iu%2Fw9Xls%3D [https://perma.cc/SW7Q-XC25]. New York has also
implemented programs to preclude the use of solitary confinement. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE
OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVS., Division of Juvenile Justice and Opportunities for Youth,
http://ocfs.ny.gov/main/rehab/Default.asp [https://perma.cc/75PE-RMAU] (last visited Feb. 21,
2016).
119. See MENDEL, supra note 118, at 17. The so-called Missouri Model has been recognized
by the American Youth Policy Center as a guiding light for juvenile justice reform and is
widely considered a great success. Id. at 5 (quoting RICHARD A. MENDEL, AM. YOUTH POLICY
FORUM, LESS COST, MORE SAFETY: GUIDING LIGHTS FOR REFORM IN JUVENILE JUSTICE (2001)).
120. Id. at 5.
121. Id. at 20.
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or destructive, they are asked to explain their thoughts and feelings
and reflect on their misbehavior with the group instead of facing
isolation or solitary confinement.122 Missouris rehabilitation-focused
system produces far lower recidivism rates than other state sys-
tems, and Missouris youth tend to be better prepared to rejoin their
communities upon release.123 Although Missouri does not expressly
ban solitary confinement in its juvenile correctional facilities, its
approach to juvenile justice largely eliminates the need to use soli-
tary confinement while producing positive outcomes.
Notably, the Contra Costa County youth corrections system in
California124 and the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice125 have
recently entered settlement agreements to end the use of solitary
confinement in juvenile correctional facilities. The terms of these
settlement agreements, when enacted, will largely mirror the terms
of Ohios settlement agreement:126 increasing the amount of time
that juveniles are allowed outside of their cells each day; requiring
juveniles in isolation to receive mental health and educational ser-
vices; and permitting disciplinary isolation for only short periods of
time.127 Nevertheless, like the lawsuit in Ohio that is the focus of
this Note, these lawsuits took a number of years to settle and speak
to the urgent need for state legislatures to take affirmative mea-
sures to eliminate their own solitary confinement practices before
more youth are harmed.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 6-9. In 2005, out of 1120 youth in Missouris Division of Youth Services
residential facilities, 66 percent were law-abiding with no recommitment to the Division of
Youth Services or an adult prison within three years after being discharged. Id. at 7. Only 24
percent of the youth in Missouris facilities were reincarcerated within three years, compared
to 43 percent of youth in Texas and 52 percent of youth in Arizona. Id.
124. See Lee Romney, Contra Costa County to End Solitary Confinement for Juveniles, L.A.
TIMES (May 19, 2015, 12:12 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-contra-costa-
county-solitary-confinement-20150519-story.html [https://perma.cc/E328-5RH8]. The settle-
ment agreement applies only to Contra Costa County, not to juvenile facilities in other
California counties. See id.
125. See Julie Bosman, Lawsuit Leads to New Limits on Solitary Confinement at Juvenile
Prisons in Illinois, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/05/us/politics/
lawsuit-leads-to-new-limits-on-solitary-confinement-at-juvenile-prisons-in-illinois.html [https:
//perma.cc/ZAK3-9ND9].
126. See infra Part IV.A.
127. See Bosman, supra note 125; Romney, supra note 124.
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There have not been many recent efforts to reform solitary con-
finement of youth at the state legislative level. In February 2014,
California State Senator Leland Yee introduced state-level legisla-
tion that would have limited the use of solitary confinement at
Californias juvenile correctional facilities.128 The bill provided that
solitary confinement be used only when youth posed an immediate
and substantial risk of harm to others and when less restrictive
options had been exhausted.129 Further, it prohibited minors from
being deprived of rights while confined.130 The bill had little chance
of passing, however, once Senator Yee was indicted on corruption
charges.131 A new bill restricting the use of solitary confinement,
authored by State Senator Mark Leno, recently passed in Califor-
nias Senate but has not been voted on by the rest of the state legis-
lature.132 Otherwise, there are no current bills that would reform
solitary confinement in juvenile correctional facilities at the state
level.133
B. Federal Statutes
There are also federal laws in place to restrict the use of solitary
confinement on juveniles.134 These laws, however, do very little
to actually prevent the use of solitary confinement in juvenile
128. See Birckhead, supra note 27, at 66 & n.439.
129. David Greenwald, Court Watch: Statewide Reforms on Solitary Confinement and Bail,
PEOPLES VANGUARD OF DAVIS (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.davisvanguard.org/2014/02/court-
watch-statewide-reforms-on-solitary-confinement-and-bail/ [https://perma.cc/B36H-LBRT].
130. See id.
131. Trey Bundy, Inside Calif. Juvenile Hall, Rare Glimpse at Solitary Confinement Cells,
CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Apr. 17, 2014), http://cironline.org/reports/inside-calif-
juvenile-hall-rare-glimpse-solitary-confinement-cells-6268 [https://perma.cc/DGP3-SAWG].
132. See Bill Limiting Use of Solitary Confinement in Juvenile Facilities Clears Senate,
SENATOR MARK LENO (June 2, 2015), http://sd11.senate.ca.gov/news/2015-06-02-bill-limiting-
use-solitary-confinement-juvenile-facilities-clears-senate [https://perma.cc/57KC-24FT].Prob-
lematically, this bill merely places time and situational limits on solitary confinement, rather
than eliminating its use. See id.
133. Legislators recently introduced bills to reform solitary confinement in Florida, Mon-
tana, Nevada, New York, and Texas, but these bills did not pass. See Ian M. Kysel, Solitary
Confinement Makes Teenagers Depressed and Suicidal. We Need to Ban the Practice., WASH.
POST (June 17, 2015, 8:34 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/2015/wp/06/
17/solitary-confinement-makes-teenagers-suicidal-we-need-to-ban-the-practice/[https://
perma.cc/TA4U-FPEL].
134. See ACLU, supra note 7, at 8.
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correctional facilities. The Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA)
applies primarily to adult correctional facilities that house juvenile
inmates, but certain provisions also apply to juvenile correctional
facilities.135 PREA dictates that to the extent possible, any young
person who is separated or isolated for disciplinary or protective
reasons should have access to daily large-muscle exercise, access to
educational programming, daily visits from medical and mental
health providers, and access to other programming.136 Although
PREA aims to improve conditions of solitary confinement for youth,
it is still permissible under PREA to subject youth to solitary con-
finement.137 In reality, few juvenile correctional facilities allow
youth to access the services mandated under PREA while in solitary
confinement.138 As various DOJ investigations have indicated, many
juvenile correctional facilities do not have the resources to provide
such programming or opt not to provide the programming to youth
in solitary confinement.139
Moreover, even if youth were guaranteed access to certain
services while in solitary confinement, research suggests that
prolonged periods of extreme isolation are still harmful to juve-
niles.140 Even when correctional facilities provide juveniles with
proper access to educational, medical, and mental health program-
ming, the potentially life-threatening effects of isolation cannot be
lightly dismissed. Furthermore, several less restrictive but effective
alternatives to solitary confinement are available when youth need
to be separated from others for disciplinary or safety purposes.141
Because of the highly restrictive nature of solitary confinement, the
inherent lack of normal social interaction that comes with it, and
the increased risk of recidivism that results from such isolation,
135. Frequently Asked Questions, NATL PREA RES. CTR., http://www.prearesourcecenter.
org/faq#n1072 [https://perma.cc/TGZ9-AWDT] (last visited Sept. 26, 2015).
136. 28 C.F.R. §§ 115.342(b), 115.378(b) (2012); see also ACLU, supra note 7, at 8-9.
137. See ACLU, supra note 7, at 8-9.
138. See supra Part I.
139. See, e.g., Special Litigation Section Case Summaries, DOJ, http://www.justice.gov/crt/
special-litigation-section-case-summaries [https://perma.cc/9KHT-L6LC] (last updated Dec.
30, 2015).
140. See supra Part I.
141. See ACLU, supra note 7, at 11. Such alternatives include brief periods of isolation
lasting no longer than four hours at a time. See infra Part II.C.
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solitary confinement poses enormous problems to juveniles and
society as a whole.142
Members of Congress have recently recognized the harmful
effects of solitary confinement on juveniles. In 2014, Senator Dick
Durbin (D-Ill.) led a Senate panel discussing banning solitary con-
finement for juveniles, pregnant women, and mentally ill prisoners,
leading Representative Tony Cardenas (D-Cal.) to introduce a
House bill that would ban solitary confinement in juvenile facili-
ties.143 Afterwards, Senators Cory Booker (D-N.J.) and Rand Paul
(R-Ky.) proposed a bill called the REDEEM Act,144 which would se-
verely restrict[ ] juvenile solitary confinement as part of a legislative
package designed to incentivize states to increase the age of crimi-
nal responsibility to age eighteen.145 Since the bill was referred to
the Senate Judiciary Committee in July 2014, however, Congress
has taken no further action to discuss or enact it.146
C. National Standards and Best Practices
In addition to the currently existing state and federal statutes,
national standards and best practices exist that describe appropri-
ate restrictions on solitary confinement and isolation in juvenile
correctional facilities.147 Although these standards do not have the
force of law, they account for the potential harmful effects of solitary
confinement on youth. For instance, the DOJs Standards for the
Administration of Juvenile Justice limit isolation to a maximum
142. See ACLU, supra note 7, at 11.
143. See Birckhead, supra note 27, at 65-66.
144. John Kelly, Sens. Rand Paul and Cory Booker Reach Cross Aisle for Bill on Juvenile
Records, Solitary Confinement, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE (July 9, 2014), https://chronicleofsocial-
change.org/news-2/sens-rand-paul-and-cory-booker-cross-aisle-for-bill-on-juvenile-records-
solitary-confinement/7451 [https://perma.cc/33P2-5ZD8].
145. See Birckhead, supra note 27, at 66.
146. S.2567 - REDEEM Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/
senate-bill/2567/text [https://perma.cc/JC2Q-CANM] (last visited Feb. 21, 2016). In January
2016, President Obama announced that he will take executive action to ban solitary confine-
ment for juveniles held at adult federal correctional facilities, but such executive action lacks
the permanence of statutory reform and will not ban the practice in state-run facilities. See
supra note 27 and accompanying text.
147. See ACLU, supra note 7, at 8.
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period of 24 hours.148 Additionally, the Juvenile Detention Alter-
natives Initiative has issued standards that recommend that room
confinement should be used only as a temporary response to be-
havior that threatens immediate harm to the child or others and
only after staff have unsuccessfully used less restrictive de-escala-
tion techniques.149 The standards further forbid periods of isolation
that last longer than four hours at a time.150
Current state and national policies regarding solitary confine-
ment of youth in juvenile correctional facilities are lacking and often
do not adhere to nationally recommended standards that account for
the harmful effect of isolation and solitary confinement on youth.
Reforms are necessary because of the patchwork of policies regard-
ing solitary confinement in place across the country. Although re-
forms are often precipitated in the courts, Part III will discuss why
the judiciary is not, thus far, the appropriate place to pursue
blanket bans on solitary confinement. Because of courts reluctance
to recognize a right to treatment for children in the juvenile justice
system, Part IV will urge that legislation correcting current stat-
utory weaknesses and mirroring Ohios recent settlement agreement
with the DOJ is the more effective force for change.
III. CASE LAW CONCERNING SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN JUVENILE
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES
The Supreme Court has never found solitary confinement per se
unconstitutional. Although the Supreme Court has addressed con-
ditions of confinement in juvenile correctional facilities in the past,
the Court has not yet directly addressed the constitutionality of sol-
itary confinement for youth in juvenile correctional facilities. Other
courts, however, have discussed the conditions of solitary confine-
ment in state juvenile justice systems. In the 1970s and 1980s,
advocates filed various lawsuits on behalf of children in juvenile
correctional facilities in different parts of the country; several of
148. Id.; see also OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DOJ,
STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE § 4.92 (1980) (Room confinement
of more than twenty-four hours should never be imposed.).
149. See JUVENILE DETENTION ALTS. INITIATIVE, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., JUVENILE DE-
TENTION FACILITY ASSESSMENT: A GUIDE TO JUVENILE DETENTION REFORM 177 (2014).
150. See id. at 178.
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these cases involved children held in solitary confinement.151 This
Part will first discuss early court decisions that suggested a right to
treatment exists before describing more recent jurisprudence
indicating that courts no longer recognize such a right.
A. Courts Describing a Right to Treatment
Using a combination of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment ar-
guments on behalf of children in juvenile correctional facilities,
advocates have argued that juveniles in state-run detention centers
have a due process right to rehabilitative treatment while in state
custody.152 They argued that conditions that were not rehabili-
tative in nature per se constituted cruel and unusual punishment.153
Advocates reasoned that, because the purpose of the juvenile jus-
tice system, unlike the adult justice system, was rehabilitation,
juveniles had a right to rehabilitative treatment while in state
custody.154 That right to treatment, they argued, precluded the use
of harsh conditions of punishment and, in some cases, the use of
solitary confinement altogether.155
Arguments advancing a right to treatment concerned conditions
in juvenile correctional facilities as well as access to medical and
psychological care.156 Although some courts seemed willing to
recognize a right to treatment for juveniles in juvenile correctional
facilities,157 courts have generally been reluctant to do so.158 The
Supreme Court has even indicated that a right to rehabilitative
treatment may not exist.159
151. See generally Paul Holland & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Whatever Happened to the Right to
Treatment?: The Modern Quest for a Historical Promise, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1791 (1995).
152. See id. at 1793.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 1792-93.
155. See id. at 1796-97.
156. See id. at 1797-98.
157. See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that the juveniles
incarcerated in juvenile correctional institutions had the right, under the Due Process Clause,
to rehabilitative treatment and were protected from cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment when conditions of confinement were not rehabilitative).
158. See Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 151, at 1810-11.
159. See id. at 1806-07 (discussing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), which em-
phasized that the Eighth Amendment was about punishment and not prison conditions).
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A handful of federal courts have held that juveniles at juvenile
correctional facilities have due process protections that amount to
a right to treatment. As a result, these courts have held that the
conditions or use of solitary confinement at certain facilities uncon-
stitutionally violate this right.160
In Lollis v. New York State Department of Social Services, a pre-
cursor to later cases that would explicitly articulate that juvenile
offenders have a right to treatment, the Southern District of New
York ruled that using solitary confinement as a treatment in a
juvenile detention facility was punitive, destructive, defeat[ed] the
purpose of any kind of rehabilitative efforts and harken[ed] back to
medieval times.161 Antoinette Lollis, a fourteen-year-old at New
Yorks Hudson Training School, was held in solitary confinement for
two weeks after fighting with a staff member.162 Lolliss requests to
meet with a psychiatrist while confined were denied.163 The court
indicated support for affidavits from a psychologist who concluded
that there was no justification for using solitary confinement unless
one want[ed] to dehumanize a young person in trouble and want[ed]
to create more trouble with such a person in the future.164
Building on the Lollis courts reasoning, the District of Rhode
Island found that isolating young boys in a state-run juvenile cor-
rectional facility in cold, dark isolation cells equipped with only a
toilet and a mattress constituted cruel and unusual punishment.165
The court held that the states primary interest in keeping juve-
niles in its custody post-adjudication was to rehabilitate youth, and,
as a result, when the state confines youth to juvenile correctional fa-
cilities, it must ensure that they receive rehabilitative treatment.166
Taking into account expert testimony that solitary confinement was
particularly psychologically damaging to youth, the court held
160. See id. at 1810-11.
161. 322 F. Supp. 473, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
162. Id. at 475-76.
163. Id. at 476.
164. Id. at 481.
165. See Inmates of the Boys Training Sch. v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1359, 1366-67
(D.R.I. 1972).
166. See id. at 1364-65.
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solitary confinement under such conditions violated this right to
treatment while in state custody.167
In 1974, the Seventh Circuit explicitly held that juveniles
incarcerated in correctional facilities had a due process right to
rehabilitative treatment and thus were protected under the Eighth
Amendment from punishments that did not advance these rehabili-
tative goals.168 Other courts would use the reasoning adopted in this
case, Nelson v. Heyne, to find that juveniles right to treatment
precluded states from using certain kinds of solitary confinement in
juvenile correctional facilities. In Morgan v. Sproat, for example, the
Southern District of Mississippi ruled that juveniles at a state
institution for delinquent boys were afforded a right to treatment
under the Due Process Clause and protected from cruel and unusual
punishment by the Eighth Amendment.169 The court found that boys
who had been assigned to the Intensive Treatment Unit, which was
a solitary confinement unit, were not afforded their due process
rights or their Eighth Amendment rights under the then-existing
conditions of confinement in the Intensive Treatment Unit.170
B. Courts Holding that There Is No Right to Treatment
Despite various federal court decisions finding that correctional
institutions had infringed on inmates constitutional rights, subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions have made lower courts less willing
to find that constitutional violations exist in various kinds of correc-
tional facilities. In Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court held that
lower courts ought to give prison administrators decisions broad
deference and avoid interfering with day-to-day operations at pris-
ons.171 Moreover, if correctional institutions allegedly infringe on
individuals constitutional rights, those allegations must be weighed
against administrators need to ensure that conditions are safe.172
Furthermore, although the aforementioned lower court deci-
sions demonstrate a willingness to adopt the right to treatment
167. See id. at 1366.
168. See Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974).
169. See 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1140 (S.D. Miss. 1970).
170. See id.
171. See 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979); see also Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 151, at 1807-08.
172. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 547; see also Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 151, at 1807.
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reasoning concerning the conditions of juveniles confinement, many
courts have rejected the argument that a right to treatment exists
in light of Youngberg v. Romeo.173 Youngberg addressed the rights
of disabled people in state-run mental hospitals, not the rights of
people in the custody of the criminal justice system.174 The respon-
dent, Romeo, had been involuntarily committed to a state-run
hospital for severely mentally handicapped adults.175 Romeo claimed
that he had due process rights to safe conditions, freedom from
bodily restraint, and habilitation (training to develop necessary self-
care skills).176 The Youngberg Court held that although Romeo had
the right to safe accommodations and freedom from restraint, the
respondent was entitled only to minimally adequate or reasonable
training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint.177
The Youngberg Court used the deferential approach from the earli-
er Bell v. Wolfish, which held that decisions about the kinds of
treatment available should be left to qualified professionals at the
state-run institution and that those decisions would be considered
presumptively correct.178
Although Youngberg did not address juvenile justice, the case
reduced the amount of juvenile justice litigation in the courts by
ruling narrowly on the right to treatment in state-run facilities.179
Youngberg obligates states to provide only the bare minimum of
training or services necessary to ensure that those in state custody
are safe and free from unnecessary bodily restraint.180 This ruling
is thus at odds with prior reasoning requiring that the state ensure
youth in detention receive rehabilitative services and not be punish-
ed in ways that contravene this rehabilitation. In other words, the
reasoning from the Youngberg decision rebuts legal arguments that
173. See Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 151, at 1793.
174. See id.
175. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 309-10 (1982).
176. Self-care skills in this case referred to those commonly taught to mentally handi-
capped individuals, such as feeding, showering, dressing, and toilet training themselves, as
well as interacting with others. See id. at 309, 311 n.7.
177. Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
178. See id. at 323; see also Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 151, at 1807-08.
179. See Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 151, at 1801-03.
180. See id.
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solitary confinement in juvenile correctional facilities is unconstitu-
tional because of its lack of rehabilitative value.181
Since the Youngberg decision, numerous courts have interpreted
the rights of juveniles under the Eighth Amendment without con-
sidering the due process arguments for a right to rehabilitative
treatment.182 For instance, in Santana v. Collazo, the First Circuit
rejected arguments that there was a broad right to rehabilitative
treatment for juveniles and held that the state has no constitution-
al obligation to rehabilitate juveniles in its custody.183 Although the
district court held that the conditions of confinement at a Puerto
Rican correctional facility that housed juveniles violated the Eighth
Amendment, it did so because the conditions of confinement were a
legitimate safety hazard for the youth confined there.184 The First
Circuit thus applied Youngbergs reasoning, which requires safe
living conditions but no rehabilitative training beyond the need to
ensure those safe conditions.
More recently, in Alexander S. v. Boyd, a district court echoing
the reasoning of Santana and Youngberg found that the state need-
ed to provide only minimally adequate or reasonable services and
training necessary to protect the interests of juveniles in state cus-
tody.185 The court held that states do not have an affirmative duty
to correct juveniles behavior.186 Although the court recognized juve-
niles are entitled to adequately trained staff, some programming
(such as anger management therapy), and safe conditions, the court
declined to accept all of the recommendations of expert witnesses.187
As a result, the court held that the state did not violate juveniles
181. See id.
182. See id. at 1810.
183. See 714 F.2d 1172, 1177 (1st Cir. 1983); see also Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 151,
at 1810.
184. See Santana v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966, 989-90 (D.P.R. 1982), affd in part, vacated
in part, 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983).
185. See 876 F. Supp. 773 (D.S.C. 1995); see also Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 151, at
1811.
186. See Alexander S., 876 F. Supp. at 798 (Although such a standard may be desirable,
it is not constitutionally mandated. All that is required is that juveniles be housed under
conditions that provide them with a reasonable opportunity to correct their behavior.).
187. See id. at 798-99.
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rights by placing them in austere lock-up cells akin to solitary con-
finement for disciplinary purposes.188
Litigation is still a strategy used to attempt to reform the juvenile
justice systems use of solitary confinement. As Tamar Birckhead
observed, however, the process of making reforms through litigation
will be slow unless the Supreme Court holds that solitary confine-
ment of youth is per se unconstitutional.189 Because of general
improvement in the safety of facility conditions, fewer cases are filed
today concerning the conditions of confinement in juvenile correc-
tional facilities than were filed in the past.190 Several states juvenile
justice systems, however, remain poorly prepared to provide the
resources that troubled juveniles need in order to hold delinquent
youth accountable for their actions while helping them to reenter
society successfully.191 The Supreme Courts decisions in Bell and
Youngberg made other courts less willing to interfere with correc-
tional policies or to find that a right to rehabilitative treatment
exists.192 Courts are thus more hesitant to issue remedial orders
that would improve conditions of confinement at juvenile correction-
al facilities based on the need to rehabilitate youthful offenders.193
Consequently, courts seem less willing to issue orders that would
restrict the use of solitary confinement due to its lack of rehabilita-
tive value. Because of this hesitation, litigation alone is unlikely to
eliminate solitary confinement in the juvenile justice system.
As explained in Parts I and II, solitary confinement should
nevertheless be eliminated from the juvenile justice system in order
to allow for more effective treatment and rehabilitation of juve-
niles in these facilities. Although changes in policies regarding
solitary confinement in certain juvenile correctional facilities have
taken place through litigation,194 courts remain reluctant to consider
188. See id. at 785. The court, however, recognized that the use of individual padlocks
on the lock-up cells presented a fire safety hazard because opening each cell was a time-
consuming process and mattress fires in the cells often did not set off the sprinkler systems
quickly enough. Id. at 786.
189. See Birckhead, supra note 27, at 69.
190. See Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 151, at 1793-94.
191. See id. at 1794.
192. See id. at 1808, 1811.
193. See id.
194. See, e.g., Birckhead, supra note 27, at 67-68 (noting that settlements have been
reached or are in the process of being reached in New Jersey, California, Illinois, Montana,
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whether youth are entitled to rehabilitative treatment while in state
custody and whether solitary confinement inhibits the potential for
rehabilitation. Consequently, as the case law has shown, litigation
alone cannot fully address the dangers of using solitary confinement
in juvenile correctional facilities. Instead, creating a major shift in
policies regarding solitary confinement across the country through
state lawmakers is a more realistic, more effective method.
The recent settlement agreement laid out in United States v. Ohio
provides a framework for eliminating the use of solitary confine-
ment in juvenile correctional facilities and ensuring that juveniles
receive proper mental and behavioral treatment while in state cus-
tody.195 This agreement can be used to spur reform in states
throughout the country, and state legislatures should adopt it in
order to phase out and eventually end the use of solitary confine-
ment. Part IV suggests statutory language mirroring the terms of
the Ohio settlement agreement to correct weaknesses and ambi-
guities in current statutes that restrict solitary confinement. This
language also provides a framework by which other states could
eliminate the use of solitary confinement.
IV. THE OHIO SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND PROPOSED
STATUTORY REFORMS
This Part will first describe the investigation and settlement
agreement in United States v. Ohio. Subsequently, this Part will
discuss statutory language that states should adopt to eliminate the
use of solitary confinement in juvenile correctional facilities.
A. Ohios Plan to Reduce and Eliminate Solitary Confinement
The Special Litigation Section of the DOJs Civil Rights Division
has authority under § 14141 of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act to investigate conditions and practices in juvenile
detention facilities and juvenile courts.196 Typically, the Special
Florida, Louisiana, and Indiana); see also supra Part III.A.
195. See United States v. Ohio, No. 2:08-cv-475 (S.D. Ohio May 21, 2014).
196. See 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012); see also Rights of Juveniles, DOJ, http://www.justice.gov/
crt/rights-juveniles [https://perma.cc/E4BC-PF5S] (last updated Aug. 8, 2015) [hereinafter
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Litigation Section investigates alleged civil rights violations to
identify patterns or practices of unconstitutional behavior.197 If the
Special Litigation Section identifies such patterns or practices, it is-
sues findings letters to the appropriate state officials either to enter
consent decrees or to initiate litigation proceedings, if necessary.198
In United States v. Ohio, the Special Litigation Section undertook
an investigation of Ohios Department of Youth Services (DYS).199
DOJ investigators examined the conditions of confinement in Ohios
juvenile justice facilities because of concerns about the conditions
in the facilities, including concerns about the use of solitary con-
finement on mentally ill youth.200 After the United States filed a
motion asking for a temporary restraining order to stop the use of
solitary confinement in DYS facilities, DOJ and DYS entered set-
tlement negotiations to address the constitutional issues at hand.201
DYS agreed to improve its mental health services and to reduce
dramatically and eventually eliminate the use of solitary confine-
ment for all youth in DYS facilities, not only youth with existing
mental health disorders.202 DYS also agreed to begin the process of
reducing the number of youth in solitary confinement as of July 31,
2014.203 The consent decree implementing this settlement agree-
ment was in place until December 2015, when DOJ and DYS agreed
to terminate the consent decree due to Ohios substantial compli-
ance with the terms of the settlement agreement.204
The settlement agreement in United States v. Ohio had three
prongs: prevention strategies, immediate intervention strategies,
Rights of Juveniles].
197. See Rights of Juveniles, supra note 196.
198. Id. Government offices like the Special Litigation Section serve an important function
by performing these investigations and providing states with models to use in order to exer-
cise best practices and protect juveniles civil rights. Due to limited resources and the duration
of investigations, however, such offices cannot possibly address all the problems in each
states juvenile justice system. 
199. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
200. See Letter from Wan J. Kim, supra note 11, at 1, 4.
201. See Ohio Settlement Press Release, supra note 9.
202. See United States v. Ohio, No. 2:08-cv-475, at 2 (S.D. Ohio May 21, 2014).
203. See id. at 2-3.
204. See Ohio Settlement Press Release, supra note 9; supra note 9 and accompanying text;
see also United States v. Ohio, No. 2:08-cv-475, (S.D. Ohio Dec. 9, 2015) (order terminating
consent decree and describing DYSs substantial compliance with terms of settlement
agreement).
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and strategies for the aftermath of seclusion.205 The settlement
aimed to reduce violence in DYS facilities while simultaneously
improving mental health services and eliminating the use of solitary
confinement in all DYS facilities.206
1. Prevention Strategies
The prevention strategies prong aimed to ensure that DYS
properly implemented mental health treatment, developed clinical
and diagnostic tools reflected in youths individual treatment plans,
and conducted internal and external review of individual treatment
plans each month.207 Furthermore, DYS also promised to reduce
violence in its facilities and to decrease the number of youth who
engage in acts of violence on a regular basis by properly diagnosing
and treating mental health and behavioral problems.208
2. Immediate Intervention Strategies
The immediate intervention strategies prong aimed to limit the
reliance on solitary confinement by eliminating its use for high
severity activity,209 unless off-site emergency medical treatment is
needed, by September 1, 2014.210 Before completely eliminating the
use of solitary confinement, DYS aimed to reduce the duration of
juveniles time in solitary confinement to no longer than seventy-two
hours during a month, and for no more than twenty-four consecu-
tive hours without special approval.211
DYS also sought to reduce the duration of seclusion by shorten-
ing the minimum amount of time that a juvenile can spend in
short-term seclusion to two hours.212 Additionally, DYS promised to
reduce the amount of time youth are permitted to be in seclusion
205. See Ohio, No. 2:08-cv-475 at Exhibit A.
206. See id. at 2.
207. See id. at Exhibit A.
208. See id. at Exhibit A, 1, 3, 6.
209. DYS defines high severity activities as activities including fights or consensual
sexual activity. Id. at Exhibit A, 1.
210. See id.
211. See id. at Exhibit A, 2.
212. See id.
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for various kinds of violent acts.213 To reduce the harmful effects of
time spent in solitary confinement, DYS planned to allow youth one
hour outside of confinement for every four hours spent confined.214
DYS agreed to ensure that youth in solitary confinement had appro-
priate access to educational, recreational, and treatment services.215
Lastly, and most importantly, DYS agreed to reduce the number of
youth in seclusion by completely eliminating the use of all solitary
confinement six months after implementing the order.216
3. Strategies for the Aftermath
The strategies for the aftermath prong was designed to enable
DYS to review the treatment plans of juveniles within two days of
an act of violence. DYS sought to review treatment goals and
interventions as well as increase the intensity of mental health
treatment in the wake of confinement.217 Additionally, these strat-
egies mandated the use of a special review team to inspect juveniles
treatment plans after multiple severe acts of violence until behavior
improves.218
B. Proposed Reforms
Ohios plan incorporated best practices and national standards
that limit short-term isolation to four hours at a time after other
less restrictive de-escalation techniques have failed.219 The settle-
ment agreement carefully balanced DYSs important interest in the
safety and security of its facilities by recognizing the need to proper-
ly control violent behavior while still aiming to address the unique
needs of youth in the juvenile justice system. Moreover, by focusing
on improving access to mental health treatment, the settlement
agreement shifted the focus of Ohios juvenile correctional facilities
from one of punishment to one of rehabilitation. In particular,
213. See id. at Exhibit A, 2-3.
214. See id. at Exhibit A, 4.
215. See id. at Exhibit A, 4.
216. See id. at Exhibit A, 5.
217. See id. at Exhibit A, 1.
218. See id. at Exhibit A, 2.
219. See id. at Exhibit A, 1-2.
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Ohios plan integrated strategies designed to inflict the least
amount of harm on youth, such as allowing them to access mental
health and educational services and reducing the amount of time
juveniles are isolated, while still holding them accountable for their
actions. Because DYS was able to implement the terms of its
settlement agreement with the DOJ successfully, this plan will
hopefully prove useful for reducing recidivism and producing
positive outcomes that more effectively rehabilitate the troubled
youth in juvenile correctional facilities across the country.220
Ultimately, adopting Ohios plan to end solitary confinement in
juvenile correctional facilities would reduce the need for solitary
confinement in the first place.
Although Ohio only recently implemented its settlement plan,
DYSs consent decree with DOJ was terminated because of the
remarkable improvement in conditions of confinement at Ohios
juvenile correctional facilities.221 This framework, therefore, will
hopefully prove effective in the future as well. The successful
transformation of Ohios juvenile justice system is not surprising,
however, based on reforms that have taken place in other states
that put an added emphasis on addressing mental health needs of
youth in the juvenile justice system.222 For instance, when Missouri
altered the structure of its juvenile justice system to focus more on
mental health in juvenile correctional facilities, it began approach-
ing juvenile discipline from a treatment perspective instead of a
punitive perspective.223 As a result, when youth in Missouris juve-
nile correctional facilities exhibit violent or inappropriate behavior,
the staff asks them to explain their thoughts and feelings in order
to hold them accountable.224 This kind of treatment de-escalates
violence and often precludes the need to consider the use of solitary
confinement at all in Missouri.225
220. See supra Part I.
221. See Ohio Settlement Press Release, supra note 9.
222. In fact, terms similar to the ones in the Ohio Settlement Agreement appeared in
recently finalized settlement agreements in Illinois and Contra Costa County. See supra notes
124-26 and accompanying text.
223. See supra Part II.A.
224. See supra Part II.A.
225. See supra Part II.A.
1052 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1019
If other states were to implement the strategies outlined in Ohios
settlement agreement, which resemble some of the strategies al-
ready used in Missouri, there would likely be fewer instances of the
misbehavior that would have previously triggered the use of solitary
confinement.226 States should adopt statutory language that imple-
ments the terms of Ohios settlement agreement and that resolves
ambiguities or weaknesses in their current statutes.
First, state legislatures should unambiguously eliminate the use
of any solitary confinement in juvenile correctional facilities for any
length of time and for any purpose while permitting the use of
short-term isolation in emergency situations, such as when youth
pose a substantial risk of harm to others or threaten security.
Specifically, states should expressly distinguish the definition of
solitary confinement, which lasts twenty-four hours or longer, from
short-term isolation, which should last no longer than four hours at
a time. This approach balances states interest in the safety and se-
curity of their facilities and staff with the interest of protecting the
physical, psychological, and developmental well-being of confined
youth.227 Furthermore, this approach would properly eliminate the
ambiguities present in other statutes that are intended to restrict
the use of solitary confinement.228
Second, states should expressly mandate that short-term isolation
may be used only after staff have tried and failed to use less restric-
tive crisis intervention techniques, such as de-escalation. States
should also mandate that short-term isolation be permissible only
after staff have obtained special approval to use such short-term
isolation. These measures would likely be more effective than using
solitary confinement as a knee-jerk reaction to smaller infractions
or disobedience. As a result, they would prevent the overuse of
isolation.229 This change would encourage staff at state juvenile
226. See MENDEL, supra note 118, at 2-3 (describing how Missouris focus on rehabilitation
has produced lower recidivism rates than other states, led to an impressive safety record, and
resulted in positive outcomes for youth).
227. See supra Part II (noting that existing state statutes that limit the use of solitary
confinement often allow it in emergency situations or when there are safety concerns).
228. See supra Part II.
229. For instance, the Maine State Prison recently implemented several alternatives to
long-term solitary confinement, including verbal de-escalation techniques and temporary loss
of visitation privileges that work much better than solitary confinement as a means of
disciplining inmates. See ZACHARY HEIDEN, ACLU OF ME.,CHANGE IS POSSIBLE:A CASE STUDY
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corrrectional facilities to hold youth accountable for their behavior
while preventing greater harm as a result of prolonged time in
solitary confinement.230
Third, states must unequivocally provide that staff will not
restrict access to medical, mental health, and educational program-
ming or services for juveniles in short-term isolation. This language
would allow states to mitigate the harmful effects of isolation on
youth, while recognizing that short-term isolation may occasionally
be necessary to defuse violent outbursts.231
Fourth, states should develop programs and policies to fund com-
prehensive preventive mental health treatment for their juvenile
correctional facilities as a part of the plan to eliminate solitary con-
finement. These programs would likely help decrease incidents of
violent behavior or disobedience, as well as help reduce rates of re-
cidivism.232 Moreover, improved access to mental health treatment
would address the aftermath of short-term isolation by encouraging
youth to reflect on their bad behavior and allowing DYS to adjust
youth treatment plans if necessary.233 This approach is similar to
the approach used so effectively in Missouris juvenile justice sys-
tem.234 It is also aligned with Ohios settlement agreement, which
implemented these programs in response to short-term isolation.235
Lastly, states should provide clear, rigid deadlines that would al-
low staff at juvenile correctional facilities to first reduce the use and
duration of solitary confinement before eliminating solitary con-
finement in juvenile correctional facilities altogether. For example,
states should first curb the amount of time per month that juveniles
may be placed in solitary confinement to seventy-two hours or less
before entirely eliminating the use of solitary confinement. Just as
OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT REFORM IN MAINE 31 (2013). Additionally, Simkins recommends
that juvenile facilities use individual psychological treatment to teach juveniles to respond
to situations without aggression. See Simkins et al., supra note 1, at 278. New York and
Massachusetts have recently developed these kinds of treatment programs, similar to
programs used in Missouri, which have reduced the use of isolation by teaching juveniles non-
aggressive ways to respond to traumatic situations. See id. at 279-80.
230. See supra Part I.
231. See supra Part II.A.
232. See supra Part I.C.
233. See Simkins et al., supra note 1, at 278-80.
234. See supra Part II.A.
235. See United States v. Ohio, No. 2:08-cv-475, at Exhibit A (S.D. Ohio May 21, 2014).
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the settlement agreement in United States v. Ohio provided DYS
staff at the states various facilities time to implement new,236 dra-
matically different procedures and protocols, states should be
permitted to gradually adjust to these new requirements.
CONCLUSION
Although the framework described in Ohios settlement agree-
ment with the DOJ is dramatic and sweeping, it appropriately
balanced the states interests in safety and security with youths
interests in proper rehabilitation and overall well-being. Solitary
confinement is a life-threatening, counterproductive practice that
creates a higher risk for recidivism and mental illness in youth.
Although some courts in the past have been willing to recognize that
youth in juvenile correctional facilities have a right to rehabilitative
treatment, modern courts are reluctant and unwilling to find that
conditions of solitary confinement for juveniles are per se unconsti-
tutional. Nevertheless, because of the potential developmental,
physical, and psychological harms that even short amounts of time
in solitary confinement have on youth in juvenile correctional facil-
ities, and because the juvenile justice system aims to rehabilitate
delinquent youth, solitary confinement should be eliminated in
juvenile correctional facilities. Although safety and security are
extremely important, states must dramatically alter their current
statutes regarding the use and duration of solitary confinement and
isolation of youth. By adopting clear statutory language that echoes
the provisions of Ohios recent settlement agreement, states have a
chance to begin the end of a practice that has no place in juvenile
correctional facilities.
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